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hazards or threats; result in numerous casualties, fatalities, displaced people, property loss; disrupt normal life support systems, essential public services, and basic infrastructure; cause significant damage to the environment; impact critical infrastructures; overwhelm capabilities of state, local, and tribal governments and private-sector infrastructure owners/operators; and require prolonged, sustained incident management operations and support activities. Top priorities for incident management are to: (1) save lives and protect the health and safety, (2) ensure security of the homeland, (3) prevent an imminent incident, including acts of terrorism, from occurring, (4) protect and restore critical infrastructure and key resources, (5) conduct law enforcement investigations, (6) protect property and mitigate damages, and (7) facilitate recovery of individuals, families, businesses, governments, and the environment. 1 On the surface, this appears to be a sound and logical approach; however, in the retrospective lens of Katrina, several significant omissions are evident. First, this one-size-fits-all approach may have merit with regard to potential hazard control, but it is ill conceived in terms of population management. It fails to recognize the fact that significant differences exist across major US subpopulations (minorities, immigrants, poor) in their perceptions of problems or willingness to believe and thus respond to authorities. For a variety of reasons, many minority and immigrant populations simply cannot be assumed to respond the way nonminority populations would respond.
The reasons may be varied, but as was seen in New Orleans, the response (or lack of response) was fairly widespread and in some ways predictable. For example, various newscasts reported that roughly 150,000 people were not able to evacuate New Orleans 2 and many more just chose not to. Authorities are apparently at a loss to explain this phenomenon, yet it is known that many residents of New Orleans lack cars. A 2000 census revealed that 27% of New Orleans households, amounting to approximately 120,000 people, were without privately owned transportation. massive post-9/11 response planning efforts had they been recognized as potentially significant.
The implications of these issues are potentially significant in terms of health, safety, and perhaps even national security, especially as the issues are not unique to New Orleans. Given a like scenario in another city of similar demographics, the same results could occur again, even with a more vigorous governmantal response to the incident. On the other hand, lack of appreciation, informed planning, and implementation of interventions to addresses these sociocultural realities will only increase pre-and post-incident problems. Based on the New Orleans experience, it should be apparent that one size does not fit all, and attention should be directed to understanding how low income communities can best be prepared in the future for both natural and manmade disasters. Indeed, unless a greater national commitment to understanding and embracing sociocultural differences-often concentrated in large urban centers-emerges, history will once again likely repeat itself.
